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# First report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Burundi

## I. Introduction

1. By its resolution 1545 (2004) of 21 May 2004, the Security Council established the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) for an initial period of six months as from 1 June, and requested me to report on developments every three months, including on the implementation of the Arusha Agreement and the execution of the Operation's mandate. The present report was prepared pursuant to that resolution and covers major developments since my report of 16 March 2004 on the situation in Burundi (S/2004/210).

## II. Political developments

### The transitional process

2. During the reporting period, the Burundian parties engaged in intense negotiations on the electoral process and post-transitional, power sharing arrangements. On 26 March, the President, Domitien Ndayizeye, invited 27 armed political parties and movements to an All-Party Forum to discuss the election and legal instruments to govern Burundi following the transition. The meetings ended without consensus. Thereafter, the Facilitation (South Africa) met with the armed political parties and movements on five occasions from April to July in Bujumbura and Pretoria. Upon taking up her duties in Bujumbura on 25 June, my Special Representative, Carolyn McAskie, worked closely with the Facilitation and the parties to move this process forward.

3. The Tutsi parties have called for some revisions to the Arusha Agreement and subsequent agreements, namely that the presidency should alternate between Hutu and Tutsi parties; there should be one (Tutsi) Vice-President with veto power, instead of two vice-presidents from different ethnic groups, as called for in the Arusha Agreement; and the interim period between the transition and full democracy should be 10 years, instead of 5 years. In addition, while, according to the Arusha Agreement, seats in the legislative bodies can be held by either Hutu- or Tutsi-dominated parties, the Tutsi parties argue that, if they are to be fairly represented in the legislative bodies, at least 70 per cent of the 40 per cent of the seats reserved for them must be occupied by Tutsis representing Tutsi-led parties and the remaining 30 per cent by Tutsis representing parties with a Hutu majority.

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The Hutu-dominated parties oppose these amendments to the agreements. It should be noted that by law, political parties must be ethnically mixed, that is, every party must have a 30 per cent minimum representation of each ethnic group.

4. During a meeting held from 18 to 21 July in Pretoria, the Facilitation stressed that the agreements should be adhered to. While the Hutu parties accepted this position, the Tutsi parties rejected it. On 22 July, Vice-President Alphonse Kadege, of the Tutsi-dominated UPRONA party, denounced the discussions as favouring the Hutu parties.

5. In order to break the deadlock, the Facilitation, in coordination with ONUB, invited all armed political parties and movements to Pretoria for a new round of consultations on 4 and 5 August. CNDD-FDD (Nkurunziza) declined to participate in the talks, stating that its position remained unchanged and that the date of the talks coincided with its annual conference. The talks ended with 20 predominantly Hutu parties agreeing to the power sharing formula put forward by the Facilitator and 11 predominantly Tutsi parties rejecting it. Nevertheless, some progress was made with a concession granted by the Hutu parties to increase by 21 the number of seats for minority groups in the National Assembly.

6. In the meantime, efforts continued to convince CNDD-FDD representatives to take the oath of office and occupy the seats reserved for them in the National Assembly, the Senate and the Cabinet, which they had refused to do in protest against the enlargement of, and the admission of former army officers into, the National Assembly. On 3 May, expressing concerns about delays in the appointment of its members to various positions, CNDD-FDD suspended its participation in Cabinet meetings and in the debates of the National Assembly. On 4 May, the Transitional Government appointed 13 local administrators, including three members of CNDD-FDD (Nkurunziza), and allocated diplomatic posts, including two ambassadorial positions, to CNDD-FDD. Nevertheless, CNDD-FDD continued to express reservations regarding the management of the National Assembly. On the sidelines of a meeting held at Pretoria on 27 July, CNDD-FDD (Nkurunziza) met on these issues with President Ndayizeye and the Speaker of the National Assembly and agreed to resume its activities within the National Assembly and the Cabinet. While CNDD-FDD is now actively participating in the National Assembly and Cabinet, there has as yet been no agreement on the terms of CNDD-FDD participation in the Senate.

**Preparation for elections**

7. On 28 May, President Ndayizeye announced the adoption by the Cabinet of a new electoral calendar that sought to postpone the elections by one year on technical grounds. Both CNDD-FDD (Nkurunziza) and FRODEBU rejected this proposal, which was welcomed by UPRONA. During its summit held on 5 June, the Regional Peace Initiative stressed that the electoral process should start without further delay, with a view to holding elections by 31 October.

8. ONUB has encouraged the parties to separate the technical aspects of electoral planning from the political negotiations, in order to move forward with the organization of elections. While progress was achieved with the establishment on 5 August of a National Independent Electoral Commission, its five commissioners have yet to be nominated. Once they are nominated, they will have to be approved by three quarters of the National Assembly. The Electoral Commission is responsible for

organizing, implementing and supervising the electoral operations, as well as the ballot count and the tabulation of the electoral results. In addition to the full establishment of the Commission and the drafting of the constitution, the Government still has to adopt communal and electoral laws.

9. Based on preliminary estimates, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and ONUB have drafted an initial budget of approximately $21 million for the elections. This budget has been communicated to the Transitional Government, but it must still be finalized by the Electoral Commission. UNDP will establish and manage a trust fund for financial contributions for elections. While donors have expressed readiness to contribute to the trust fund, to date only UNDP has made any contribution ($1 million) towards the budget.

**Negotiations with FNL (Rwasa)**

10. Since taking up her duties in Bujumbura in June, my Special Representative has been working with the Facilitation and others concerned to build confidence between the Transitional Government and FNL with a view to facilitating a settlement between them. After holding an internal congress from 18 to 21 April, FNL declared it would suspend hostilities against the Transitional Government. Within 24 hours FNL broke the ceasefire, however, apparently reflecting a difference on the way forward between those who participated in the congress and the military leadership on the ground.

11. At their summit of 5 June, the Heads of State of the Regional Peace Initiative imposed immediate travel sanctions on the leaders and called on the African Union to recommend appropriate political and legal action if FNL had not joined the peace process within three months. At a meeting with my Special Representative in Nairobi on 17 and 18 July, FNL again expressed its readiness to cease fire, as well as to disarm and demobilize, on the condition that it be allowed to "tell its story to the international community and that its people are protected". It continued to maintain, however, that it would not join the Arusha peace process, which it viewed as only a power sharing arrangement. For its part, the Transitional Government expressed its scepticism of the sincerity of FNL (Rwasa), alleging that, in the meantime, FNL had escalated its attacks against the Burundian Armed Forces (FAB) in Bujumbura Rurale.

12. On 2 August, claiming that Government forces had been reinforced in Bujumbura Rurale, FNL again offered to cease fire, provided the following conditions were met: displaced persons in Bujumbura Rurale were allowed to return to their homes; the agreement signed in December 2003 by CNDD-FDD (Nkurunziza) and the Transitional Government was implemented; CNDD-FDD returned to its cantonment areas and the Burundian Armed Forces were confined to barracks; and ONUB verified FNL activities in the area. Sceptical of the readiness of FNL to ceasefire, and stating that it had not reinforced its positions as claimed by FNL, the Government did not accept the ceasefire offer, but indicated that it would be ready to engage in formal ceasefire negotiations to that end at a later, undetermined date.

13. Tensions in Bujumbura Rurale escalated thereafter, culminating in the massacre of some 160 Congolese Banyamulenge refugees at a UNHCR transit camp at Gatumba on 13 August. Preliminary reports indicated that the attack was well planned and executed and involved the use of automatic rifles and incendiary

grenades. Banyamulenge refugees were specifically targeted, while refugees of other ethnic groups and repatriated Burundians were left unharmed. FNL immediately claimed responsibility for the attack, although eyewitnesses reported to ONUB that FNL had actually attacked a nearby FAB base, while Congolese Mayi-Mayi and FDLR (Rwandan ex-FAR/Interahamwe) elements carried out the Gatumba massacre. FNL later stated that it had attacked the refugee camp as an act of retaliation for the support armed Banyamulenge refugees had provided to FAB forces when attacked by FNL. For its part, FDLR has denied any involvement in the attack.

14. At the request of the Security Council, in its presidential statement of 15 August (S/PRST/2004/30), a joint MONUC/ONUB team began an investigation on 16 August to establish the facts surrounding the massacre. Their findings and recommendations will be reported to the Security Council.

15. At a meeting with my Special Representative on 15 August, President Ndayizeye expressed concern about a possible alliance of FNL, Congolese Mayi-Mayi and ex-FAR/Interahamwe forces. Immediately after the massacre, the Burundian Armed Forces increased their presence in Bujumbura Rurale and along the border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which remains closed. At the same time the FAB Chief of Staff indicated that FAB would not hesitate to attack the Democratic Republic of the Congo if an attack were warranted; that statement was later retracted by President Ndayizeye.

16. On 16 August, a mass burial held for the victims of the massacre was attended by thousands of people, including President Ndayizeye and senior Congolese and Rwandan delegations. The funeral took on a political tone, with some Tutsi elements expressing opposition to President Ndayizeye and the United Nations. A positive development was a meeting of President Joseph Kabila and President Ndayizeye on the sidelines of the Dar es Salaam summit on 18 August, at which they agreed to work closely together to ease tensions in the subregion.

**Summit of the Regional Peace Initiative**

17. The twenty-second summit of the Regional Peace Initiative on Burundi was held in Dar es Salaam on 18 August. The President of the United Republic of Tanzania, Benjamin Mkapa, chaired the meeting in his capacity as Deputy Chairman of the Regional Initiative, since the Chairman of the Initiative, President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, was unable to attend. The summit was attended by the Heads of State of Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique, South Africa and Zambia; the Deputy President of South Africa, the Deputy President of Uganda and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Rwanda; and representatives of Ethiopia, the African Union and the United Nations.

18. The regional leaders endorsed the proposal on power sharing put forward at Pretoria on 6 August. They also called upon the Transitional Government to establish the National Independent Electoral Commission by 19 August, and to draft the post-transition constitution within three weeks of that date. In addition, the Heads of State condemned the attack on the Gatumba refugee camp, declared FNL a terrorist organization and requested the African Union and the Security Council to support this decision.

### Implementation Monitoring Committee

19. At its eighteenth session, held from 20 to 23 April, the Implementation Monitoring Committee, under the Chairmanship of my former Special Representative for Burundi, Berhanu Dinka, underlined the need for all political actors to ensure the adoption of the legal instruments necessary to begin the electoral process; for the armed political parties and movements to fulfil the preconditions for disarmament and demobilization; and for FNL (Rwasa) to enter into negotiations with the Transitional Government. At its nineteenth session, from 12 to 14 July, the Committee urged the Government and the National Assembly to set up the Electoral Commission and decided that, should the parties fail to reach consensus on a post-transition constitution by 31 July, it would, in accordance with the powers invested in it by the Arusha Agreement, hire national or international experts to draft the document. At its twentieth session, on 16 and 17 August, the Committee, noting the progress achieved with the establishment of the National Independent Electoral Commission on 5 August (see para. 8), decided to reassess the issue of the appointment of experts at its next session, after the summit of the Regional Initiative on 18 August.

## III. Security sector reform and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

20. Under resolution 1545 (2004), the Security Council provided ONUB with a mandate to contribute to the efforts of the transitional authorities in carrying out the reforms necessary to integrate the national defence and internal security forces and, in particular, to assist in the training and monitoring of the police. To this end, ONUB has created a security sector reform cell, to provide advice to the Government in planning and implementing the integration and reform of the armed forces.

### Military integration

21. On 17 June, the Joint Ceasefire Commission endorsed a joint operations plan for the pre-disarmament, disarmament and demobilization of combatants, which has since been approved by the Cabinet. The endorsement of the plan, which is a prerequisite for beginning the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, was delayed for months by protracted discussions on the definition of a combatant (and hence his/her eligibility for demobilization assistance). It was agreed that the criteria would include proof of membership in an armed political party or movement, and a series of weapons-to-combatants ratios.

22. In January, the Government announced its intention to integrate all ex-combatants from the armed groups who wished to join them into the national military structures, which would then be downsized through the demobilization of some 14,000 combatants per year. While concern was at first expressed that this could imply a military force in the initial year of more than 80,000 combatants (including FAB), information received from the armed groups indicates that the figure is likely to be closer to 70,000. Of these, 13,000 will be transferred to the police and from 10,000 to 15,000 child soldiers, pensioners and war wounded would be immediately demobilized. This would leave an initial military of some 45,000, of which 25,000 would have to be demobilized to reach the Government's target of an

army of 20,000. The Government still has to prepare an operational plan for the integration, demobilization and reform of the military; and it has yet to indicate how it would cover the budget necessary to support this process.

23. With the support of the Governments of Belgium, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, a camp was established at Tenga (Bujumbura Rurale) for the integrated training of combatants from the various armed political parties and movements. The training of a 2,400-strong joint security brigade, including participants from all parties signatory to the Arusha Agreement, is scheduled to begin late in August. The Netherlands has provided the funding required to support activities, equipment and supplies for the camp for six months.

**Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration**

24. The technical preparations for the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme are moving forward. The first demobilization centre at Gitega was made available to the National Commission for Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration on 15 July. Two other centres, to be used respectively by FAB and the armed political parties and movements, are scheduled to be ready shortly.

25. UNICEF and the National Structure for the Demobilization of Child Soldiers, with ONUB support, have demobilized over 2,100 child soldiers from the Burundian Armed Forces, the Gardiens de la paix community-based militia, CNDD (Nyangoma), PALIPE-Agakiza (formerly PALIPEHUTU of Etienne Karatasi) and CNDD-FDD (Jean Bosco Ndayikengurukiye) and reunited them with their families.

26. Members of the armed political movements and parties are assembled in 12 pre-disarmament assembly areas throughout the country. ONUB military observers monitor those areas regularly. To date, the Burundian Armed Forces have not yet begun cantoning their troops, stating that continued deployment is required because of ongoing hostilities with FNL (Rwasa) and to secure the country's borders. The Transitional Government has requested CNDD-FDD (Nkurunziza) to deploy some troops to support FAB military operations. CNDD-FDD (Nkurunziza) has claimed that it has some 7,000 combatants patrolling in Cibitoké, Bubanza and Bujumbura Rurale.

27. At its 21st plenary meeting on 22 July, the Ceasefire Joint Commission extended until 31 July 2004 the deadline for the parties to provide certified lists of names and numbers of their combatants and armaments. The Burundian Armed Forces were also to present a cantonment plan for their troops and heavy weapons by the same deadline. All parties — except CNDD-FDD (Nkurunziza) and FAB — submitted certified lists to the Commission on 5 August. CNDD-FDD blamed technical problems (lack of computer facilities) for its failure to submit its list. FAB have also not provided a list of troops and weapons or a cantonment plan.

28. Although funding is available for demobilization and reintegration, primarily through the World Bank, the lack of a clear operational plan for the integration into civilian life of demobilized combatants remains a source of concern. Moreover, since FAB and CNDD-FDD (Nkurunziza) forces are still engaged in military operations, the commencement date for the process remains unclear. In the meantime, thousands of armed elements remain in pre-disarmament sites.

**Police**

29. The civilian police component of ONUB has begun work on the assessment of the current police structure; conducting analyses of training required; assisting with the formulation of a comprehensive plan for security arrangements during the elections; and formulating a strategic plan for the overall enhancement of the functioning of the local police. In accordance with its deployment plan, to date, 25 civilian police officers against an authorized strength of 120 have been deployed; additional officers will be deployed in accordance with requirements on the ground.

30. On 23 March 2004, the Government established an État major intégré de la Police nationale, in effect a national coordinating committee, comprising the police institutions and the signatories to the Arusha Agreement. ONUB provides advice to the committee. To date, the committee has established a timetable and agreed on internal rules and procedures for the creation of a national police service. It has also recommended an organizational structure for the Burundian police force. ONUB has urged the committee to develop, as a matter of priority, a national plan of action in coordination with the ongoing reform of the armed forces.

31. The Burundian police have been charged with the disarmament of civilians and provision of a secure environment for the elections. On 6 July 2004, the État major intégré finalized a plan for the formation, training and equipment of an interim police force for the period leading up to the electoral process. According to the plan, a total of 14,400 police officers, forming 20 tactical police units of 720 men and women, would undergo a two-month training course in order to provide security for the elections. The plan has been discussed in various forums with both national and international stakeholders. ONUB will act in an advisory capacity, and monitor the fulfilment of some preconditions for the training of the tactical police units, such as ensuring the participation of all the parties concerned, the payment of salaries, and selection criteria (age and education).

## IV. Military and security developments

32. The Gatumba massacre occurred after a period of escalating tension in Bujumbura Rurale, while other areas of the country witnessed relatively secure conditions. There were, however, some isolated breaches of the ceasefire agreements in those areas. On 8 July, the Burundian Armed Forces attacked combatants of PALIPEHUTU-FNL (Mugabarabona) in Mpinga (Cibitoké), accusing the group of not having abided by its agreements when it occupied a former FAB position outside of its pre-disarmament assembly area. The incident happened before the Joint Ceasefire Commission had been given an opportunity to assess the situation. ONUB mediated an agreement by which both parties withdrew to agreed positions. In a second incident, on 23 July, FAB attacked members of CNDD (Nyangoma) at Muyinga, alleging that the group had conducted activities outside of its pre-disarmament assembly area.

33. The security situation in Cibitoké Province and Bujumbura Rurale continues to be a matter of great concern. In Bujumbura Rurale, FNL (Rwasa) and joint FAB/CNDD-FDD (Nkurunziza) forces regularly engage in skirmishes, particularly around the communes of Kabezi, Muhuta and Mutumba. From 25 to 27 July, heavy fighting resulted in the temporary displacement of nearly 25,000 persons from these communes. On 8 August, FNL ambushed a convoy, which included the Anglican

bishop and his entourage. The convoy escaped unharmed, although FNL later told ONUB that it would attack "pro-Government civilians as long as the population in Bujumbura Rurale continues to suffer at the hands of the Government".

34. The ONUB Force Commander, General Derrick Mbuyiselo Mgwebi (South Africa), has raised with the FAB Chief of Staff reports of FAB human rights abuses, particularly the cordoning-off of villages, arbitrary arrests and shooting at civilians attempting to flee such arrests. The Chief of Staff indicated that he would try to ensure that his forces respected human rights.

35. Reports of FAB engagements with ex-FAR/Interahamwe elements in Cibitoké Province after the May/June hostilities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo were received throughout July and August. ONUB and MONUC have increased their monitoring presence on their respective sides of the border, with a view to interdicting any Rwanda ex-FAR/Interahamwe or Congolese elements that may seek to cross the border.

36. The instability and tensions in these border areas were ignited with the massacre in the UNHCR camp at Gatumba on 13 August (see paras. 13-16 above). Following the massacre, FAB increased their presence at Rugombo and Karurama (Cibitoké), in addition to Gatumba. ONUB also deployed one company to assist in the provision of security at the UNHCR transit centres at Rugombo and Karurama. ONUB is also working closely with UNHCR and the Government to move the refugees to areas of safety.

**Deployment of the Operation**

37. On 1 June 2004, some 2,612 troops of the African Mission in Burundi (Ethiopia, Mozambique and South Africa, and 29 military observers from Burkina Faso, Gabon, Mali, Togo and Tunisia) were "re-hatted" as ONUB troops. As at 23 August, ONUB totalled 3,312 troops, composed of battalions from Ethiopia and South Africa; one company from Mozambique; an engineering company and a Level II hospital from Pakistan; an aviation unit and other support units from South Africa; and 102 military observers.

38. Force generation for ONUB has met with delays, as Member States have been slow to respond to requests for specialized units and some troop contributors have requested delays in previously agreed deployment timelines, while others have deployed troops without the necessary equipment. Moreover, no troop contributor has as yet indicated interest in providing a maritime unit or in pursuing the idea of the "over-the-horizon" force envisaged in my last report (S/2004/210). Consequently, the deployment of ONUB is behind schedule. However, while South Africa indicated that it would not be able to continue to provide many of the specialized units, it has agreed to maintain its maritime, special forces, military police, headquarters protection and engineering units until replacements are deployed, thus improving the initial operational readiness of ONUB.

39. In accordance with its concept of operations, ONUB has deployed a battalion each to Gitega (covering the Provinces of Gitega, Kayanza, Kirundo, Muramvya, Muyinga, Mwaro and Ngozi) and Bubanza (covering Bubanza and Cibitoké Provinces). One company remains in Bujumbura and will be built up to battalion strength, with an area of responsibility including Bujumbura Rurale and Bururi. As

the Operation expands, it will deploy a battalion each to Makamba (c vering Makamba, Rutana, Ruyigi and Cankuzo) and Cibitoké.

40. In response to the continuing instability, ONUB has begun daily patrols in Bujumbura Rurale, and will soon maintain a 24-hour presence in the Province. In addition, some 100 military observers have been deployed to field sites, mostly in Bujumbura Rurale. When ONUB initially deployed into Bujumbura Rurale, it encountered some difficulties in coordinating its freedom of movement. The situation has recently improved, however, and there is regular, close coordination between ONUB and FAB. Meanwhile, the maritime unit conducts daily patrols on Lake Tanganyika between the Ruzusi River, the border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Kabezi in the south. To enhance coordination, particularly relating to cross-border movements of armed elements and arms trafficking, MONUC has deployed a liaison officer to ONUB and it is envisaged that an ONUB officer will be posted with MONUC in a reciprocal arrangement.

## V. Human rights

41. Regrettably, there has been little improvement in the human rights situation in the country. Summary executions of civilians, torture, sexual violence, illegal and arbitrary detention continue, with impunity, primarily targeting the civilian population. The situation is particularly grave in Bujumbura Rurale. Both FNL and joint FAB/CNDD-FDD forces have been accused of grave violations of international humanitarian law and human rights, as well as looting and subjecting the population to a constant state of fear.

42. On 29 May 2004, eight civilians, including two young children, were killed at Kinama commune, allegedly by government forces. On 11 July, the local administrator of Mutambu commune escaped a grenade attack suspected to have been carried out by FNL (Rwasa). Nine people were reported to have been wounded, three of whom later died. On 14 July, seven people were killed in Mukike commune, also allegedly by FNL (Rwasa). Most of the attacks attributed to FNL (Rwasa) target local administrators.

43. From 16 to 25 May, the Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Tuliameni Kalomoh, led a multidisciplinary assessment mission to Burundi to consider the advisability and feasibility of establishing an international judicial commission of inquiry for Burundi, as called for under the Arusha Agreement. The report is expected to be finalized shortly.

44. It will be recalled that the crisis of 1993 was preceded by widespread accusations of witchcraft, which were used to frighten rural populations. Such accusations have resurfaced in recent months; there are reports of alleged wizards and witches having been beaten and in some cases burned to death. Numerous cases of poisoning have also been reported in various parts of the country. ONUB plans to launch investigations shortly into this and other human rights violations.

45. Some of the former combatants of CNDD-FDD (Nkurunziza) have established administration and justice systems parallel to the Transitional Government, including the creation of illegal detention centres. On 8 July 2004, 12 people were transferred to the prison of Ruyigi after having spent from three to nine months in detention at the CNDD-FDD (Nkurunziza) position at Karinda under inhuman and

degrading conditions, showing signs of torture. Both CNDD-FDD (Nkurunziza) and FNL (Rwasa) also reportedly fine and tax the population of Bujumbura Rurale.

46. In close coordination with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ONUB intends to deploy more than 40 human rights observers in five field offices to monitor and report on human rights violations. ONUB will also work with the Humanitarian Coordinator and the humanitarian community on protection of civilian issues. The Operation has also established a gender unit to work on advancing gender issues, in particular to support women's participation in the electoral process and promote strategies to deal with sexual violence. In addition, ONUB has established a special position for a code-of-conduct officer to ensure a policy of zero tolerance of sexual violence or intimidation by United Nations staff in Burundi.

## VI. Economic situation

47. In 2003, the Burundian economy recorded a negative growth rate of 1 per cent in real terms, aggravating already dire poverty and humanitarian problems. An estimated 67 per cent of the population live below the poverty line, and 6 per cent of the adult population are HIV-positive; there were an estimated 25,000 AIDS-related deaths in 2003. Inflation is at 10 per cent.

48. The Government has concluded agreements with the Bretton Woods institutions on a programme of economic reform to stabilize the macroeconomic situation, facilitate the mobilization of foreign assistance, lay the foundation for growth, and reduce poverty. Macroeconomic policies to encourage growth and reduce inflation are being implemented. The Government has set a projected real growth rate of 5 per cent, based on the expectation that normal rainfall and the return of refugees would lead to a 4 per cent increase in agricultural production. The Government has also set a target inflation rate of 5.5 per cent, based on a reduction in the price of basic commodities, stable petrol prices and a prudent fiscal policy.

49. On 29 July, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General convened a meeting of 11 donors, namely Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United States of America, the European Community and the World Bank, to identify criteria for expediting the disbursal of some $1.3 billion in pledged funds. The donors stressed the need for the Government to clearly define the programmes for which it had sought funding, including the provision of detailed programmes for good governance, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, security sector reform, and reform of the police. The donors also called on the Government to ensure transparency in its defence budget, the preparation of a clear plan for integrating ex-combatants, and the establishment of the National Independent Electoral Commission.

## VII. Humanitarian situation

50. While the humanitarian situation in much of Burundi has been slowly improving, the situation in Bujumbura Rurale remains precarious. Tens of thousands of people have been adversely affected by the conflict, particularly in the communes of Muhuta, Mutambu and Kabezi. Large segments of the population have been displaced and their access to agricultural fields impeded.

51. The hostilities of May and June in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo led to the influx of over 19,000 refugees into Cibitoké Province and Bujumbura Rurale over a three-week period beginning on 9 June. Prior to the Gatumba massacre, UNHCR had started moving willing refugees to a site in Muyinga Province. In the wake of the massacre, the authorities have agreed to accelerate the relocation of the refugees further east. The World Food Programme has provided food stocks, and UNICEF and its partners are providing trauma counselling for the survivors.

52. The Tripartite Commission, composed of UNHCR and the Governments of Burundi and the United Republic of Tanzania, held its eighth plenary session in Bujumbura on 23 and 24 June to discuss ways of speeding up the repatriation and resettlement of Burundian refugees from the United Republic of Tanzania. Thereafter, a new entry point was opened at Makamba to facilitate additional returns. As at 30 July, more than 65,000 refugees have returned since the beginning of the year, including 61,915 refugees repatriated under UNHCR auspices, and 200,000 in total since 2002. Increased returns are likely in the coming months pending a political agreement on the elections. In total, it is estimated that 777,000 Burundian refugees remain in the United Republic of Tanzania, over 287,000 in camps, 170,000 in settlements, and 300,000 — most of whom had fled Burundi in 1972 — in villages.

## VIII. Mine action

53. In accordance with its mandate, ONUB has established a Mine Action Coordination Centre, which will provide mine action support to the Operation and to the Transitional Government and humanitarian organizations. A draft strategy for mine action in Burundi has been prepared and is currently being circulated for comments. Coordination mechanisms have been established and effective working relationships have been developed with all concerned stakeholders. Standard operating procedures for clearance activities undertaken by ONUB force assets have been prepared by the Mine Action Coordination Centre and approved for implementation by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

## IX. Financial aspects

54. The General Assembly, by its resolution 58/312 of 18 June 2004, authorized me to enter into commitments in the amount of some $156 million, inclusive of the amount of $49.7 million for the establishment of ONUB up to 30 June 2004 and $106.3 million for the maintenance of the Operation for the period from 1 July to 31 October 2004. This authorization has been granted by the Assembly pending review of the full budget of the Operation for the 2004/05 financial period at the main part of its fifty-ninth session.

55. As at 31 July 2004, unpaid assessed contributions to the special account for ONUB amounted to $146.7 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations at that date amounted to $2,478.7 million.

## X. Observations

56. The international community was horrified by the massacre at Gatumba on 13 August. I would like to express my condolences to the families of those who were killed and injured in that massacre. The Governments of Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as the international community as a whole, must ensure that those responsible are held accountable. The Gatumba massacre and reports of a possible alliance between FNL and Rwandan and Congolese armed groups is a worrying development not only for Burundi but also for the entire subregion. I am encouraged by the meeting of Presidents Kabila and Ndayizeye on 18 August and I call on them to ensure that their Governments and military forces continue to work closely together to ensure security on their common border. I urge the Government of Rwanda also to work closely with the Governments of Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to put an end to the scourge of ethnic-based hostilities and abuse that has afflicted the people of the subregion for so long.

57. I am also deeply concerned about the possibility of heightened ethnic tensions in Burundi following the Gatumba massacre. The Burundian parties must not allow this horrific incident set them back after years of progress towards peace and development. Despite delays in some areas of the peace process, the negotiations on post-transition power-sharing had shown signs that the parties were willing to find common ground to implement the Arusha timetable and preserve peace in their country. I call on them to continue in this direction. Finding ways of ensuring that all groups in the country are secure and able to participate meaningfully in the government and economy is the only path towards long-term stability and development.

58. The human rights abuses that innocent civilians in Burundi continue to suffer are unacceptable. All those responsible should realize that the age of impunity is over. I call on those responsible to stop such abuses immediately and remind them they will be held accountable. I also call on the Transitional Government to work actively and openly with ONUB and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, as well as other donors, to strengthen its own human rights and judicial institutions and to ensure that they operate fairly with regard to all groups in the country.

59. My recommendation to the Security Council in my last report (S/2004/210) that it consider establishing a United Nations peacekeeping mission in Burundi, was based on the request of the Burundian parties and their stated commitment to complete the transitional process and hold elections by 31 October. While the parties have continued active negotiations to that end, they have yet to demonstrate the good faith and political will necessary to fufil their commitments to each other and to the Security Council.

60. Security sector reform, disarmament and demobilization remain far behind schedule, owing to the lack of active participation, particularly of the Burundian Armed Forces and CNDD-FDD (Nkurunziza). The electoral timetable is also falling behind schedule.

61. I urge the parties to be guided by the advice of my Special Representative that the technical preparations for the elections should be separated from the political aspects. I expect that the Government will complete the establishment of the

National Independent Electoral Commission by 29 August, as requested by the Regional Peace Initiative, and ensure the completion of the drafting of the constitution and the adoption of all remaining electoral laws shortly after.

62. In closing, I would like to thank my former Special Representative, Berhanu Dinka, for the role he has played over many years in assisting the Burundian peace process. I would also like to express my gratitude to the Regional Initiative, and also to South Africa for its untiring efforts to assist the Burundian people both through its role as Facilitation and its contribution to ONUB. I also pay tribute to my Special Representative, Carolyn McAskie, and to all the women and men of ONUB and the United Nations funds and programmes in Burundi for their dedication to bringing peace to that country.

## Annex

### United Nations Operation in Burundi: military and civilian police strengths

| | *Military component* | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Country* | *Military observers* | *Staff officers* | *Troops* | *Total* | *Police officers* |
| Bangladesh | 2 | | | 2 | |
| Benin | 4 | | | 4 | 2 |
| Bolivia | 3 | | | 3 | |
| Burkina Faso | 7 | 2 | | 9 | 6 |
| Cameroon | | | | | 5 |
| Chad | 7 | | | 7 | |
| China | 3 | | | 3 | |
| Ethiopia | 3 | 3 | 853 | 859 | |
| Gabon | 6 | | | 6 | |
| Gambia | 2 | | | 2 | |
| Guatemala | 3 | | | 3 | |
| Guinea | 2 | | | 2 | 1 |
| India | 2 | 2 | | 4 | |
| Jordan | 2 | 2 | | 4 | |
| Malawi | 3 | | | 3 | |
| Malaysia | 3 | | | 3 | |
| Mali | 11 | 2 | | 13 | 11 |
| Mozambique | 3 | 4 | 225 | 232 | |
| Namibia | 3 | | | 3 | |
| Nepal | 3 | 10 | 680 | 693 | |
| Niger | 2 | | | 2 | 7 |
| Nigeria | | | | | 1 |
| Pakistan | 3 | 6 | 314 | 323 | |
| Paraguay | 3 | | | 3 | |
| Peru | 3 | | | 3 | |
| Philippines | 3 | | | 3 | |
| Romania | 5 | | | 5 | |
| Russian Federation | 6 | | | 6 | |
| Senegal | 5 | 4 | | 9 | 1 |
| South Africa | 2 | 24 | 1 041 | 1 067 | |
| Spain | | 1 | | 1 | |
| Sri Lanka | 2 | | | 2 | |
| Togo | 11 | 3 | | 14 | |
| Tunisia | 8 | 3 | | 11 | |
| Turkey | | | | | 1 |
| Uruguay | 3 | | | 3 | |
| Yemen | 3 | | | 3 | |
| Zambia | 2 | | | 2 | |
| **Total** | **133** | **66** | **3 113** | **3 312** | **35** |




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